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Abstract 
 
International law on children’s rights, in important ways, usurps state authority over the ideology 
of childhood, establishing complicated and exacting standards that all states should adopt. The 
international community’s enshrinement of children as rights holders and consolidation of power 
over the boundaries and standards of childhood mirrors international consolidation of authority 
over human rights in general after World War II, as the international community increasingly 
became the arbiter of acceptable treatment of citizens by states. In this paper, I argue that a 
globalized model of childhood that emerged after World War II was important to the 
development of the international system, serving to consolidate power and legitimize 
international institutions and order. I further examine the growth of this globalized model of 
childhood, one codified today in international law and developed primarily in Europe and the 
United States in the late 19th and early 20th centuries and diffused from these points of origin 
throughout the world. The paper uses the development of domestic and international law 
forbidding the death penalty for child offenders as a point of entry into the study of childhood, 
children’s rights and the international system. It investigates the mechanisms of diffusion for the 
norm against the child death penalty and identifies three principal mechanisms of norm diffusion 
based on the findings of case studies and their types of law; colonial influence; temporal period 
of abolition; and participation in international legal regimes and institutions.  
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Introduction 
When we speak of children in the field of international relations, we tend to speak of 
them as war victims, child soldiers and child laborers. They have been the bystanders, 
beneficiaries or casualties of the changing international order in the post-World War II era. 
Children inhabit a specific narrative in global society, their image invoking ideas of innocence, 
vulnerability and the need for protection. As a result, children became the symbols of many 
international institutions devoted to advancing human rights and democracy around the world in 
the last few decades of the 20th century, yet they have been largely absent from the international 
relations literature itself.i  
I seek in this paper to theorize children as a historically important part of state 
consolidation and international order and as worthy recipients of greater attention in the field of 
international relations. I examine the development of domestic and international law forbidding 
the death penalty for child offenders as a point of entry into the history of children, childhood 
and the international system. I argue that the widespread process of state consolidation that took 
place in the late 19th century and throughout the 20th century—a process whereby the state began 
to regulate large swaths of civil and private life, including children’s lives—was aided by the 
development of the ‘global child,’ a figure that required steadily increasing levels of protection 
by the state, and later, by the international community. These protections were extended even to 
the least sympathetic children, those who committed the most egregious crimes, making the 
diffusion of norms and law about the child death penalty particularly illustrative of wide-scale 
state consolidation around the world. Protections for child criminals over the last century and a 
half were also illustrative of international consolidation—or the merging of disparate sources of 
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authority over children into more centralized international institutions, such as the United 
Nations Children’s Fund or UNICEF.   
For society to protect infants, toddlers, youth and even teenagers who pose no physical 
threat to the community at large,ii there is little public controversy or debate. For society to 
protect child offenders whose crimes if committed by an adult could result in the death penalty, 
however, is far more expressive of a common construction of children and childhood. The 
abolition of the death penalty for child offenders—a ban found in 96 percent of states at the end 
of the 20th century—is therefore a bold policy position, suggesting that the boundaries of 
childhood are inviolable and that there is nothing that a child can do, no crime too brutal or too 
violent, to revoke the protection childhood affords.  
In this paper, I argue that a globalized model of childhood that emerged after World War 
II was important to the development of the international system, serving to consolidate power 
and legitimize international institutions and order. I further examine the growth of this model, 
one codified today in international law and developed primarily in Europe and the United States 
in the late 19th and early 20th centuries and diffused from these points of origin throughout the 
world. Regarding the abolition of the child death penalty, norms and law forbidding the penalty 
for child offenders were specifically advanced by the British and French colonial powers. I 
present in this paper my dataset consisting of dates of abolition of the penalty and thereby 
explain the process by which a specific construction of childhood emerged, spread through 
bureaucratic methods of state organization, and was globalized. Yet in tracking the development 
of a global or universal model of childhood, I do not suggest that the model is found everywhere, 
only that it was and is presented to world society as if it were universal, as though it applies to 
all, regardless of locality or context. 
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Although the global diffusion of a specific construction of childhood is compelling as 
both a historical study and political exercise, why should international relations scholars care 
about the evolution of childhood in society or about the international diffusion of norms and law 
protecting children? In an age marked by terrorism, international war and economic turmoil—a 
period when security and economic matters would seem to trump all other issues—why should 
we concern ourselves with children and international efforts to protect them? I suggest that we 
should not underestimate or give short shrift to the dramatic social promotion of childhood over 
the last century and a half. Children were re-imagined and redefined from the legal property of 
their fathers to internationally protected and even ‘sacrilized’ citizens of the international 
community—their position enshrined in dozens of international legal texts and in national law 
(Cunningham, 1995; Zelizer, 1994). The transformation of children from legal nonentities into a 
distinct, cloistered and highly protected class was remarkable, challenging and ultimately serving 
to alter many of the core precepts of law and social organization in societies around the world. In 
effect, the promotion of childhood triggered such profound changes in family structure and state 
organization that by the end of the 20th century, legal distinctions between children by race, class 
and gender were discarded in favor of a universal model of children’s rights.  
The state of the field 
Unlike other social sciences that focus attention on children, international relations has 
yet to fully theorize the position of children and the development of norms and law about 
childhood in global society. Children are largely absent from the international relations literature 
apart from the child conflictiii and child labor literaturesiv and more recently from the emerging 
body of literature on child citizenship.v The children in these literatures are mostly victims—of 
war, poverty, abuse and neglect. Relatively little has been said about children as rights holders or 
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about the role that ideas about children and childhood have played in the shaping of international 
order. Important work in recent years has begun to remedy this exclusion, especially research 
identifying a link between norms and law about childhood and power in the international system 
(Lewis, 1998; Pupavac, 2001; Watson, 2006; Van Bueren, 2011; Fass, 2011). This paper is 
situated within this discourse. It seeks to reveal the importance of the construction of children 
and childhood to the development of the international system after World War II, and 
specifically considers the impact of children as rights holders on the process of state 
consolidation and on international institutions. 
On the broader topic of children in general, sociological institutionalists argue that 
childhood is a social construction, one that has been built (and continues to be built) on a global 
scale. This view is consistent with that of scholars in international relations and law, 
constructivists and international legal theorists included, who contend that citizens and legal 
subjects are constructed over time (Adler, 2002; Barnett, 2005; Hopf, 1998; Keck and Sikkink, 
1998; Onuf, 1989; Onuf, 2002; Zimring, 1982). There is strong support for the argument that 
childhood is a social construction because its meaning has been understood differently at 
different times and places. Moreover, attitudes or moral positions about the nature and 
capabilities of children have likewise varied markedly. 
Despite these varied constructions, a body of international law has developed that 
prescribes a detailed model of childhood and the ideal experiences of children, including the 
delineation of children’s needs and the requirements for a healthy, safe, productive and 
successful life as global citizens. This model has several defining features, including the 
immaturity, vulnerability and reduced culpability of children (biologically, psychologically, 
intellectually); the upper age limit of 18 years; and a relationship between the state and the child 
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in which the state assumes responsibility for the child’s welfare. Consensus on this model 
evolved and eventually could be found in many areas of law, including those governing access to 
primary school education and protection from exploitative labor practices. Although differences 
remain in practice, the position of children in law is remarkably similar around the world. An 
important aspect of this universal model is the lesser standard of culpability for children and their 
exclusion from adult criminal penalties.  
This overwhelming consensus on the meaning and boundaries of childhood did not 
always exist, however. Childhood is a historical construct developed over centuries. Before the 
19th century, children were afforded little, if any, legal protection from abuse, neglect and 
exploitation. In many parts of the world, there were no age-based limits on criminal penalties 
such as the death penalty. In some states, including the United Kingdom and states that share its 
legal heritage, children as young as seven could be executed if intent or mens rea could be 
demonstrated; this was true in the United States well into the 20th century.vi Yet by the century’s 
end, almost all states had either ended the death penalty for all crimes and all offenders or limited 
the penalty to those 18 years and older. How did this dramatic historical transformation take 
place? How did the position of children in society evolve from one in which children were 
legally indistinguishable from adults to one in which they were a separate, distinct and protected 
class, shielded from familial and state abuse? How did this particular construction of childhood 
come about? 
Indeed, by the end of the 20th century, a predominantly Western idea of childhood—
characterized by the age parameters of birth (or conception)vii to 18—had become an 
international idea, one that included protection from adult criminal penalties, and principally 
from the death penalty. This is not to suggest that all states have adopted this norm and no longer 
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execute child offenders. Indeed, there have been several holdouts in the 21st century: China, the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, the United States, Pakistan, 
Nigeria and Yemen. All of these states, including the United States, have been at odds with 
international human rights law in general (Moravcsik, 2005). At the present time, only two of 
these states (Iraq and the United States) are considered to be compliant with international law 
regarding the child death penalty.  
Finally, this is a study of childhood, not of children per se. Although the idea of 
childhood reflects beliefs about children, the terms are not synonymous or coterminous. The idea 
of childhood includes certain understandings about the nature of children, their morality, their 
potential, how they should be raised, and what environment fosters their development. As states 
consolidated power over children and increased regulation in multiple areas of their lives over 
the course of the 19th and early 20th centuries, the state became the principal arbiter of the 
appropriate treatment of children. The result of state consolidation was the emergence of one 
model of childhood, one standard, one idealized, globalized—and increasingly scrutinized— 
period of human life.  
Methodology 
When a state chooses to restrict its application of the death penalty, it can do so in many 
ways: First, it can limit the penalty by abolishing it for classes of people, such as women; second, 
for types of crimes; third, by age, such as for children or the elderly; and fourth, for all crimes 
and all offenders (general abolition). When a state chooses this route—general abolition—it can 
be difficult to pinpoint the motivation behind the policy change. In contrast to abolition for child 
offenders only, the motivation behind general abolition may be less clear or unknown. However, 
since general abolition applies to children, the outcome is the same: The state has stopped 
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executing children. My study therefore includes both states that abolished the penalty altogether 
and those that abolished only for child offenders, albeit in different ways. To analyze the legal 
diffusion of the norm against the child death penalty, I first had to compile its history. I created 
three datasets. First is the list of states that abolished the death penalty for all crimes and all 
offenders (general abolition). Second is the list of states that abolished the death penalty for child 
offenders only, regardless of whether they would later abolish the penalty outright. This second 
list required the identification of the date of the case or code by which states first excluded child 
offenders under the age 18 from the death penalty. I looked at national penal and criminal codes 
in the 19th and 20th centuries and examined the development of death penalty jurisprudence as it 
(most commonly) narrowed over time to apply only to adults convicted of violent (and usually 
deadly) crimes. These national laws express a key characteristic of the modern idea of childhood, 
namely, that age is an identifier of childhood, and that childhood is bound by age limits. In 
particular, these laws employ the age 18 as the upper age limit of childhood, the modern point of 
demarcation between children and adults. At this age or above, criminal offenders may be treated 
as adults and become eligible for adult penalties. The cases and codes included in this second list 
employ the age limit of 18 in their death penalty statutes, without qualification such as mens rea. 
Primary source material was used where possible, insofar as it (or a reliable translation) could be 
found in French, Spanish or English. Some legal codes are simply not available in American 
libraries, thus limiting the research.   
Third, I compiled the complete universe of cases that includes the dates when states first 
abolished the death penalty for child offenders plus dates for general abolition, minus any 
duplication. If, for example, a state abolished the penalty for child offenders in 1933 and then 
abolished the penalty outright in 1965, as happened in the U.K., only the 1933 abolition was 
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counted. Altogether, this third dataset consists of 143 states since the mid-19th century that either 
abolished the death penalty specifically for child offenders under the age 18 or banned the 
penalty for all crimes and all offenders. The dataset is presented in Table 1 below. It was also 
from the smaller dataset (states that abolished only for child offenders) that I drew my cases, 
since this type of abolition conveyed a particular intention regarding children and their protection 
from adult criminal penalties.  
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TABLE 1: LIST OF STATES THAT ABOLISHED THE DEATH PENALTY FOR CHILD OFFENDERS 
UNDER THE AGE 18, WITH DATES OF ABOLITION IN LAW; WHERE (G) MEANS GENERAL 
ABOLITION OR ABOLITION FOR ALL CRIMES AND ALL OFFENDERS 
 
VENEZUELA (G) 1863 
SAN MARINO (G) 1865 
COSTA RICA (G) 1877 
BRAZIL (G) 1882 
ECUADOR (G) 1906 
FRANCE   1906 
URUGUAY (G) 1907 
COLOMBIA (G) 1910 
PARAGUAY 1914 
PANAMA (G) 1922 
TRINIDAD 1925 
ICELAND (G) 1928 
UNITED KINGDOM 1933 
MAURITIUS 1935 
ITALY    1941 
LEBANON  1943 
DENMARK  1945 
JAPAN    1949 
JAMAICA  1951 
GRENADA  1953 
HONDURAS (G) 1956 
TUNISIA  1956 
ETHIOPIA 1957 
NIGERIA  1959 
AZERBAIJAN 1960 
GHANA    1960 
KUWAIT   1960 
UKRAINE SSR 1960 
ARMENIA  1961 
NEW ZEALAND 1961 
TANGANYIKA 1961 
MADAGASCAR 1962 
MONACO (G) 1962 
USSR     1962 
TANZANIA 1964 
UGANDA   1964 
SIERRA LEONE 1965 
ALGERIA  1966 
DOMINICAN 
REPUBLIC  (G) 
1966 
GAMBIA   1966 
CAMEROON 1967 
KENYA    1967 
AUSTRIA (G) 1968 
BULGARIA 1968 
JORDAN   1968 
BELARUS  1969 
BENIN    1969 
POLAND   1969 
VATICAN CITY 
STATE (G) 
1969 
ISRAEL   1971 
FINLAND (G) 1972 
SWEDEN (G) 1972 
AUSTRALIA 1973 
CZECHOSLOVAKIA 1973 
HUNGARY  1973 
EGYPT    1974 
IRAQ     1974 
SYRIA    1974 
BAHRAIN  1976 
PORTUGAL (G) 1976 
UNITED ARAB 
EMIRATES 1976 
YEMEN PEOPLE’S 
REPUBLIC (SOUTH)  1976 
ALBANIA  1977 
RWANDA   1977 
CONGO    1978 
NETHERLANDS 1978 
ROMANIA  1978 
LUXEMBOURG (G) 1979 
NICARAGUA (G) 1979 
NORWAY (G) 1979 
SRI LANKA 1979 
COOK ISLANDS 1980 
CAPE VERDE (G) 1981 
SINGAPORE 1985 
VIETNAM  1985 
GERMANY (G) 1987 
HAITI (G) 1987 
LIECHTENSTEIN 
(G) 
1987 
SOUTH KOREA 1988 
BARBADOS 1989 
CAMBODIA (G) 1989 
SLOVENIA (G) 1989 
TUNISIA  1989 
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ANDORRA (G) 1990 
CROATIA (G) 1990 
CZECH REPUBLIC 
(G) 
1990 
IRELAND (G) 1990 
MOZAMBIQUE (G) 1990 
NAMIBIA (G) 1990 
SAO TOME AND 
PRINCIPE (G) 
1990 
SLOVAK 
REPUBLIC (G) 
1990 
SOUTH AFRICA 1990 
MACEDONIA 
(FORMER 
YUGUSLAV 
REPUBLIC) (G) 
1991 
ANGOLA (G) 1992 
FORMER 
REPUBLIC OF 
YUGOSLAVIA 1992 
PERU     1992 
SWITZERLAND (G) 1992 
GUINEA-BISSAU 
(G) 
1993 
MYANMAR  1993 
PHILIPPINES 1993 
RUSSIA   1993 
SEYCHELLES (G) 1993 
SLOVAKIA 1993 
UZBEKISTAN 1994 
ZIMBABWE 1994 
DJIBOUTI (G) 1995 
MOLDOVA (G) 1995 
NORTH KOREA 1995 
SPAIN (G) 1995 
BELGIUM (G) 1996 
GEORGIA (G) 1997 
INDONESIA 1997 
NEPAL (G) 1997 
TANZANIA 1997 
CANADA (G) 1998 
ESTONIA (G) 1998 
LATVIA   1998 
LITHUANIA (G) 1998 
TAJIKISTAN 1998 
TIMOR-LESTE (G) 1999 
TURKMENISTAN 
(G) 
1999 
UKRAINE (G) 1999 
COTE D'IVOIRE (G) 2000 
INDIA    2000 
MALTA (G) 2000 
BOSNIA-
HERZEGOVINA (G) 
2001 
CYPRUS (G) 2002 
MONTENEGRO (G) 2002 
SERBIA (G) 2002 
ST. VINCENT AND 
THE GRENADINES 2002 
THAILAND 2003 
BHUTAN (G) 2004 
GREECE (G) 2004 
SAMOA (G)  2004 
SENEGAL (G) 2004 
TURKEY (G) 2004 
LIBERIA (G) 2005 
MEXICO (G) 2005 
USA      2005 
ARGENTINA (G) 2008 
UZBEKISTAN (G) 2008 
BURUNDI (G) 2009 
TOGO (G) 2009 
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According to constructivists in international relations, norms have lifecycles consisting of 
stages of emergence, acceptance and internalization. The emergence period is distinguished from 
the internalization period (or period of widespread adoption) by a stage of rapid acceptance or 
support for the norm. This acceptance period is commonly called the cascade, when large 
clusters of norm adoption are observable (Keck and Sikkink, 1998).  
The norm abolishing the death penalty for child offenders had two cascades—two periods 
of rapid adoption—as captured in Figure 1 below. The second cascade is larger than the first, 
with more states adopting the norm and a higher rate of adoption.   
FIGURE 1: THE NUMBER OF STATES THAT ABOLISHED THE DEATH PENALTY FOR CHILD 
OFFENDERS, BY YEARviii 
 
 
 
Beginning in the 1960s, a first cascade of countries outlawed the penalty for child offenders 
(either by limiting the penalty to those 18 and older or by abolishing it outright—see Table 1 
above on the two paths to abolition). This trend was driven by the rapid decolonization that took 
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place around the globe at this time, as almost half of states that abolished during this period were 
recent colonies or trustees. Following a brief pause in this abolitionist trend, from 1982-1984, the 
second cascade began in 1985 and ended in 2005. The data suggests that the period after 2005 
can be thought of as the late period of norm diffusion, or the period when the norm abolishing 
the child death penalty has been widely adopted or institutionalized. Even though more states 
could ban the child death penalty, by the late period, the norm had successfully cascaded and 
been enshrined as international law.  
From the smaller dataset of states that abolished the death penalty solely for child 
offenders, I selected case studies according to the time period in which states abolished, taking 
into account geographical diversity and colonial history. The history of childhood outside of the 
West is a grossly under-researched area, which, when compounded with another under-
researched area (the child death penalty), results in many hurdles to accurate historical 
information. Accordingly, my choice of case studies (especially those of former colonies) was 
also based on the availability of material. These case studies include early adopters—states that 
abolished between 1863 and 1959—(Ethiopia, France, Japan, Tunisia and the United Kingdom); 
first cascade adopters—1960-1981—(Algeria, Kenya and Tanganyika/Tanzania); and second 
cascade adopters and laggards—1985-2005—(China, Pakistan and the United States).  
With the datasets collected and the norm’s lifecycle mapped, I then organized these states 
into categories by dominant mechanism of diffusion—or the mechanism to which the norm’s 
adoption can be principally attributed. I determined these mechanisms of diffusion based on the 
findings of my case studies and their types of law (common, civil, religious), colonial influence, 
temporal period of abolition and participation in international legal regimes and institutions. 
Through the case studies, three mechanisms of diffusion became evident:  
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1. Principled activism: Primarily domestic (but also cross-national), principled 
actors petitioned states for changes in law and for policies of child 
protection. 
Cases: France, Japan, Pakistan, the United Kingdom and the United States 
 
2. Coercive socialization: British and French colonialism led to the forced adoption 
of child protection laws in some colonies and to the legal acculturation 
that followed.  
Cases: Algeria, Japan, Kenya, Tanganyika/Tanzania, Tunisia 
 
3. Globalized childhood: Western norms about children in terms of age, 
development, maturity and competence became a universal model applied 
to children in all states, economies and cultures after World War II. This 
model derived its authority from the natural sciences and later from the 
social sciences and international law.  
Cases: China, Pakistan, the United States 
 
In addition, there was one outlier, Ethiopia, that underwent a process of ‘voluntary socialization,’ 
whereby the country’s leaders enthusiastically invited Western legal scholars to draft laws that 
included restricting the death penalty to those 18 and older, as discussed in more detail below.  
Although the mechanisms listed above correspond roughly with the temporal periods of 
early-, cascade- and late-period adoption, this paper is organized by mechanism of diffusion. 
This method offered a more efficient way of presenting the findings, as the temporal spread of 
the norm does not explain its processes of diffusion: Different mechanisms of diffusion were 
evident in abolitionist countries across periods. Furthermore, there was no period—early, 
cascade or late—that was associated with a single mechanism of diffusion (See Figure 2 below). 
Some mechanisms were more commonly found in certain periods, however; for example, the 
influence of colonial law was greater during the cascades (1960-2005) than in any other period.   
Figure 2: Case studies by date and mechanism of diffusion 
 15 
 
As Figure 2 demonstrates, principled activism was important in both the early and late periods of 
the norm’s lifecycle. 
Finally, the paper traces the model of childhood as it diffused internationally through 
law—specifically, criminal law addressing child offenders, usually those convicted of murder or 
rape. Legal diffusion may be different from other types of diffusion. Law gives us important 
information about a state’s attitude toward children by revealing the parts of childhood the state 
chooses to regulate. The exclusion of criminal offenders from the death penalty based on age 
sends a powerful message of protection for children, as the ban applies to all children, murderers 
and rapists included.  
The Child and the State 
 The abolition of the death penalty for child offenders under the age 18 was part of a 
larger and longer-term trend of law and policy reform to protect children. The protection of 
children in law first emerged in the West around the 16th century—in the form of regulation of 
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poor and vagrant children as well as laws governing apprenticeships in England—but protections 
greatly increased both in force and scope in the 19th and 20th centuries.ix This reformist trend was 
in turn part of a broader pattern of humanistic reform in Western societies that also produced a 
specific type of liberal state following the Enlightenment (Cole, 2005: 273; Donnelly, 2003). The 
goal of the liberal state was national progress, defined principally by economic growth (and 
driven by the harnessing of available resources for profit and gain), and, eventually, by a higher 
quality of life for the state’s citizens (Meyer, 2004: 43).  
A global trend in national policies toward progress and justice naturally shaped the 
application of the death penalty. Types of torture accompanying the penalty were limited in the 
West in the latter half of the 18th century (Hunt, 2007: 76), and death penalty reform began in 
earnest in the 19th century, as many states, especially in Latin America and Europe, abolished the 
penalty for all crimes and all offenders. States also began to limit the penalty by age in the 19th 
century. As discussed above, in the United Kingdom (and in states that inherited or were 
influenced by its legal system), the penalty was limited to those older than seven years of age, or 
14 if mens rea could not be demonstrated. Many states in Europe, especially, raised the age of 
eligibility for the penalty to 16 by the early 20th century, as did many colonies of the United 
Kingdom and France.  
A new wave of colonialism in the 19th and early 20th centuries demanded a broadening of 
the idea and application of rights from the national to the universal in order to confer legitimacy 
on the colonialist enterprise (Pagden, 2003: 177-178). Nineteenth-century colonialism was 
justified under the guise of spreading ‘civilization’ and ‘civilized’ culture; a prelude to this effort 
was a return to thinking of rights in terms of the laws of nature, such that cultures that did not 
exhibit the same norms or customs held by ‘civilized’ people could be “dispossessed by those 
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who do” (Pagden, 2003: 183-184). The result was that rights could only be understood within the 
context of ‘civilization,’ as defined by the Europeans, and by a particular political order, 
representative government (Pagden, 2003: 190). This trend toward universalism was still limited, 
however, by citizenship in a state. As such, the laws of nature could be applied to the colonies, 
via the expansion of colonialism, but the colonized themselves had no say in the matter.  
The dual goals of progress and welfare were made explicit in the colonialism that defined 
the period: British and French colonialism were justified on these pillars. Empires would acquire 
colonies and (ostensibly) prepare them for entry in the global market, while harvesting their 
resources to enrich themselves. These empires also felt a duty to expose their colonies to cultural 
‘enlightenment’ though the imposition of Christianity and metropolitan customs, norms and 
values. This was the civilizing mission, and it involved children in important ways, as will be 
seen. 
Death penalty practice provides an interesting lens through which to examine 
colonialism’s civilizing mission. The British, for example, used the death penalty in their 
colonies to instill fear and the rule of law. But apart from the Mau Mau rebellion—when an anti-
colonial force in British East Africa rose up against the British in the 1950s—they were careful 
to distance themselves from the act of capital punishment (Hynd, 2008: 416). The British were 
sensitive to criticism of the death penalty and its savage nature and sought to sanitize it through 
reforms, even while complete abolition was being sought at home (Hynd, 2008: 417). These 
pressures originated from the metropole, or mother country, because “those who believed 
themselves to be civilized had a duty not to behave towards ‘backwards’ or ‘barbarian’ peoples 
in a cruel and ‘inhuman’ manner” (Pagden, 2003: 191). In other words, the British had to walk a 
fine line between fear and charity.   
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 It was precisely this unsustainable conflict between the need to instill fear and to 
demonstrate imperial benevolence that led both to the demise of the British Empire in Africa and 
to the protection of children. Both the British and French empires felt growing pressure from 
their citizens to do more for the people of the colonies, and this pressure especially concerned 
young girls who were in ‘moral danger.’ Compulsory marriage, genital mutilation and child 
marriage upset metropolitan sensitivities and ultimately forced colonial governments to intervene 
in traditional and family law, something they had long sought to avoid. (Stoler, 1989; Stoler, 
1992; Burton, 1998; Grier, 1994; Fourchard, 2006). Colonial intervention in family law further 
inflamed tensions between the colonizers and the colonized. After World War II, colonialism 
was widely seen as morally bankrupt, and its rapid disintegration meant that a new international 
order was needed, one based on human rights that could be ensured against states or regimes.   
The liberal state and the child 
The development of a liberal state devoted to national progress and the welfare of its 
citizenry was aided by the promotion of the natural and social sciences in the 19th and 20th 
centuries. The emergence of a professional class of scientists as well as a preoccupation with 
objectivity through scientific methods in the 19th century drove efforts toward progress in the 
liberal state (Bloch, 2003; Daston and Galison, 1992). These experts claimed the ability to 
separate the normal from the abnormal, the desirable from the undesirable, and the moral from 
the amoral (Bloch, 2003: 16). As a result, a single standard of normality emerged that allowed 
states to develop national policies to ensure the ‘normal’ and to address the ‘abnormal’ child.  
In delineating a class of persons, the idea of childhood fostered by Europeans and 
Americans was co-constitutive of ideas about how children should be treated. As concerns were 
raised by child advocates (increasingly in the 19th century but also much earlier) about child 
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abuse and neglect, the state intervened. The new interest in child welfare validated and 
institutionalized ideas about childhood as a vulnerable period of life when children need 
protection, structure and guidance. Protection came in the form of statutes that outlawed neglect 
and abuse; structure and guidance were provided by educational institutions, reformatories, 
industrial schools, church, and, decreasingly, places of employment. 
State institutions were established to determine the extent of abuse and neglect and the 
required manner of state intervention. Abuse and neglect, however, were difficult to gauge 
without benchmarks. Child advocates, quick to use science to inform their actions, encouraged 
and supported the attention paid to children by science. Doctors established guidelines for 
nutrition, hygiene, welfare and psychological well-being (Baistow, 1995: 22; Hendrik, 1997: 12). 
Social scientists developed curricula; investigated the effects of child labor, abuse and neglect; 
and advanced theories about children’s distinct nature. Developmental psychology, in particular, 
“offered new, scientifically constructed indices by which ‘normal development’ could be 
quantitatively as well as qualitatively distinguished from the ‘subnormal’ or ‘abnormal.’ ” 
(Baistow, 1995: 26-27). These guidelines progressively became part of the dogma of childhood 
as competing norms, especially those not legitimized by science, were discarded.  
In line with theories of agentic constructivism,x standards of behavior toward children 
evolved as ideas about childhood evolved. One of the principal ideas that developed in the West 
in the 19th and early 20th centuries was that children were less culpable for the crimes they 
commit and should not be given adult penalties such as the death penalty. As scientific methods 
to study children were applied outside the West, the model of the globalized child began to gain 
purchase. Western studies of children in the periphery provided support for the contention that 
all children experience the same stages of development, and have the same requirements for 
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good health, education, leisure and need for labor restrictions (Bloch and ebrary Inc., 2006; 
Burman 2008; Sen 2004a, 2004b, 2005, 2007).  
Eventually, a single standard of childhood was constructed predominately in the West—
the standard of a globalized child with the same needs, abilities, desires and limitations 
regardless of citizenship. Yet the idea that childhood is a social construction says little about how 
it came to be the particular social construction enshrined in state and international law today or 
about how a specific aspect of the model, such as reduced culpability, came to be integral to our 
understanding of children’s capacities. Sociological institutionalists have argued that since all 
states share the goal of economic progress, they are highly susceptible to new ideas about how 
best to achieve this progress (Meyer, 2004: 43). A focus on children as a tool of development 
became common in the 19th century, as states such as the United Kingdom recognized a 
connection between children’s health and the ability of the empire to win wars (Baistow, 1995). 
The interest in children and childhood also served the goal of progress, as educating and caring 
for children as the future heirs of the nation came to be seen as a sound investment in the 
stability and prosperity of the state. By the 1960s, a focus on children as a key part of national 
development had become global wisdom. 
 Children were also a tool of empire, as missionaries, travelers and scientists used Western 
ideas about children and families to measure the “ ‘civilization’ and ‘culture,’ and the ‘nature’ of 
primitive families and childhood in exotic places” (Bloch, 2003: 16). According to Marianne 
Bloch, in her research of curricula, studies of children in the colonies and other cultures outside 
the West “produced ‘new’ types of ‘advanced’ and ‘progressive’ knowledge about childhood, the 
family, and schooling” that resulted in the discovery of “universal truths” about children and 
their development (Bloch, 2006: 8). Satadru Sen has shown in his studies of juvenile orphanages 
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and reform schools in 19th- and 20th-century India that the children in government facilities 
became the subjects of countless studies and experiments designed to identify the core, natural, 
universal child by separating the child from his or her racial identity (Sen 2004a, 2004b, 2005, 
2007). In a study of the British in Nigeria, Laurent Fourchard argues that the establishment of the 
Social Welfare Office in 1941 created juvenile delinquents as a distinct group of criminals 
(Fourchard, 2006: 115). The colonial administration and judicial system in Nigeria actually 
“legislated ‘juvenile delinquency’ into existence” (Fourchard, 2006: 116). Moreover, the 
construction of juvenile delinquency and the preoccupation with the ‘moral danger’ of young 
girls was not unique to Nigeria or even to the British colonies, as “special judicial machinery for 
the ‘treatment of juvenile offenders’ was also established” in the empires of the French, Belgians 
and Portuguese in the 1940s and 1950s (Fourchard, 2006: 116). 
By the 20th century, the idea of childhood diffused to the colonies was age-specific, 
meaning that it was not defined by behavior, rite, ritual, race, class, status or gender, but rather 
by age. The age 18 became widely accepted as the upper age limit of childhood in criminal codes 
after World War II, and this boundary was extended to areas of child protection even outside 
criminal matters. The model of childhood that took shape after World War II was not initially 
one that bestowed many rights upon children, but rather one that imposed duties upon adults. 
Children were, however, crucial to national identity, considered vulnerable and in need of care, 
and were increasingly seen as less culpable for their actions than adults.  
The acculturation of colonies to Western legal and political systems, carried out most 
extensively by the French in Algeria, included an inherent logic of state consolidation over 
citizens, including children. Laws prohibiting the child death penalty were commonly found in 
criminal codes, and the British took the lead in standardizing criminal procedures and sanctions. 
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At independence, many former colonies had laws prohibiting the death penalty for child 
offenders under the age 18. These colonies maintained after independence, at least initially, the 
state organizational structure they had inherited, including the prohibition of the child death 
penalty and other protections for children. Many even increased protections for children in the 
first few decades of statehood. These states had internalized aspects of the colonial state model 
that not only recognized the validity of children’s protection, but also could not imagine a 
solution to issues of child welfare outside of law. They were, in effect, socialized to 
predominantly Anglo-French ideas of child protection (including protection from adult criminal 
penalties) and to the role of the state in guaranteeing it. 
The widespread standardization of the treatment of young criminals by the British 
(especially) helped cast the model of childhood that would form the basis for the international 
children’s rights regime in the second half of the 20th century. The same connection between 
children’s welfare and civilization, made explicit in the British and French colonial enterprises, 
was used by international governmental organizations (IGOs) and international nongovernmental 
organizations (INGOs) to promote a particular type of development that emphasized a single, 
common standard for children’s education, health and welfare, a standard that came to include 
the norm against the death penalty for child offenders. 
Stages of diffusion 
The following sections will present the primary mechanisms of diffusion for the norm 
against the child death penalty: principled activism, coercive socialization and the globalization 
of childhood. This section also discusses laggards, or states that were able to resist or reject the 
norm. 
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Principled activism  
The emergence of the norm against the death penalty for child offenders was the result of 
efforts by child advocates and death penalty opponents in a handful of countries in the 19th and 
20th centuries. The movement was especially strong in the United Kingdom, where norm 
entrepreneurs served as ministers in government, social workers, intellectuals, scientists and 
lawyers, although I found comparable evidence of early activism in France, Japan and the United 
States. These norm entrepreneurs advanced ideas about children’s vulnerability, reduced 
culpability and need of care. As described above, these conclusions about children were justified 
by scientific studies on the nature, characteristics and capabilities of children, studies that 
diagnostically separated ‘normal’ from ‘abnormal’ childhood and legislated accordingly.  
Concern for the treatment of child offenders was part of the broader humanistic trend 
toward progress and justice, since children represented the future of the nation as well as 
reflected its sense of compassion and its regard for the welfare of its citizens. Reforms for 
children in the United Kingdom, for example, came out of state reforms that limited the authority 
of the monarchy and the ruling class, and prescribed change in numerous aspects of society, 
including its penal system.  
Although principled activism for children was present in all of the cases, it was especially 
important for early and late adopters. Some late adopters like the United States and Pakistan 
required additional late-stage activism against the child death penalty to bring these states into 
compliance with international law and the global, codified model of childhood. 
In the U.S. case, the combination of two mechanisms of diffusion—principled activism 
and the globalization of childhood—is attributable to the United States’ unique history of child 
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protection efforts. Under the leadership of child advocates, the United States became a laboratory 
for the development of norms of child protection in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, 
especially in the area of juvenile justice, before losing ground as the 20th century progressed 
(Linde, 2011). The pattern of U.S. diffusion then came full circle, with a new generation of 
domestic activists emerging late in the 20th century to pressure the United States to comply with 
the international norm against the child death penalty. These activists successfully leveraged the 
global model of childhood, which included the ban on the penalty for child offenders. 
Coercive socialization  
The colonies of the British and French underwent a process of ‘coercive socialization,’ 
whereby norms, legal principles and rubrics of state organization were diffused to the colonies. 
The British and French established bureaucracies that administered colonial law and drafted and 
enforced public policy based on their own legal principles. These laws and policies specified the 
relationship between the state and the child, one that would include criminal sanctions. In the 
four Middle Eastern and North African case studies (Algeria, Kenya, Tanzania/Tanganyika, and 
Tunisia), I found four steps of coercive socialization that were not necessarily linear: First, the 
British and French colonial powers built bureaucracies that allowed them to efficiently achieve 
their goals. These goals varied among the colonial powers and colonies, but they were primarily 
the goals of progress (wealth accumulation) and justice (mission civilatrice or white man’s 
burden).  
The second step of coercive socialization was a form of legal imperialism, whereby the 
British and French enforced laws derived from their own legal systems in which individuals were 
the central legal subjects. As stated above, the British were especially motivated to develop a 
single criminal code and procedure throughout their colonies. French colonial law was much 
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more complicated. It varied to a far greater extent by colony, time period, offence and offender. 
In some cases, French law was applied directly to the colony; in others, there were a number of 
different legal sources for a particular area.  
Third, child law and policy developed, straddling disparate areas of law, government and 
custom. Invariably, these laws and policies dictated a paternal relationship between the state and 
the child that would eventually (in many former colonies) usurp parental, tribal or community 
power over children. Law governing children’s lives developed primarily in two areas: criminal 
law and family law. Restrictions to the death penalty by age were typically found in criminal 
codes or criminal procedure codes and, with a brief lag of a few decades in some cases, 
eventually reflected the penalty’s age limit in the metropole. Family law mandated birth and 
death registrations and regulated marriage, divorce and child support. Although both the British 
and the French were hesitant to impinge upon family law, both empires eventually did so to 
some degree. 
Fourth, colonial society was socialized over time to the goals of the British and French 
colonial powers (to the twin goals of progress and justice), to the method of state organization 
(bureaucracy), and to other predominately Western legal values and principles. These societies 
were thus socialized to the authority of the state over children and to the various protections and 
guarantees that state authority entailed, prohibitions of the child death penalty among them. 
Evidence for socialization is found in the choice by many colonies to continue the protections for 
children begun under the empire, and even to increase them upon independence. Although some 
countries, such as Tunisia and Tanzania, would eventually revoke some of these protections, this 
reversal would not come until later.  
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One case study, Japan, had some similarities with the colonial cases. Under occupation 
after World War II, Japan reformed its criminal law based largely on its occupiers’ Anglo-
American legal system. The occupation period resulted in an unprecedented number of legal 
advisers that set out to reconstruct the Japanese state and reshape its legal practices (Chen, 2003: 
52-53). Although different in circumstances from the colonial cases, Japan’s acculturation to 
Anglo-American legal norms (but not the common law system) was nonetheless coercive. 
Although the child death penalty had at the time only been abolished in the United Kingdom and 
not in the United States, Japan’s abolition of the penalty corresponded closely with child 
protection trends in the West in general and served as a continuation of child protection efforts 
from Japan’s pre-war history.  
Coercive socialization through law and state organization is not the typical way we 
understand coercion or socialization in international relations. Legal coercion is different from 
military force or economic aid. Law imposes a society’s values, dictates legitimate and 
illegitimate behavior, creates social units and levels of authority, and, to a degree, establishes the 
agency of actors within the system by recognizing (or failing to recognize) their legal status as 
individuals (or groups) with a given identity. In my study, I found that the British and French 
colonial powers established an identity for children apart from that of their parents, kin, clan, 
religion and even gender in Algeria, Kenya, Tanzania/Tanganyika and Tunisia. The legal 
category ‘child,’ as a Western construction, was universal and applied equally (in law) to all 
children below the age 18 in these colonies. Although law as a type of coercion may seem less 
distasteful or violent at first blush than other forms of coercion, it can be more powerful than an 
occupying force. By defining and organizing social relations in the Western image, colonial 
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powers socialized the colonies in a way that dictated, to a large degree, their structure and 
characteristics after independence.  
As mentioned, there was one anomalous case study, Ethiopia, which was similar to the 
cases of Algeria, Japan, Kenya, Tanzania/Tanganyika and Tunisia. The mechanism of diffusion 
in Ethiopia can best be thought of as ‘voluntary socialization,’ whereby the state enthusiastically 
and proactively sought out Western aid in the development of its legal system. The post-war 
period was a vibrant time of legal development in Ethiopia, with the drafting of the 1955 
Constitution and six additional codes in the 10 years that followed. All of these codes were either 
crafted by foreign lawyers or “inspired by foreign sources,” including British, French, Indian, 
Israeli, Italian and Swiss sources (Vanderlinden, 1966-7: 257; Fisher, 1969: ix). The penal code, 
which included the ban on the child death penalty, was drafted by a Swiss jurist, Jean Graven, 
and had numerous foreign influences; large parts of it were based on the U.S. Constitution 
(Franklin, 1961: 267).  
Through colonialism and the diffusion of Anglo-French law, legal systems and 
principles, children were given a place in the state order as individuals. State authority over 
children usurped parental, clan, kinship or tribal control and created children as legal subjects 
that were equal to one another under the law throughout the state. As these laws and policies 
created child subjects in the image of the metropolitan child, the beliefs of child advocates, 
international aid workers and development specialists that all children possess the same nature, 
needs and characteristics were confirmed. This growing consensus on the common nature of 
children reinforced the efforts of international institutions, such as UNICEF, to make children a 
prominent part of development initiatives and inspired the movement for international children’s 
rights that would begin in the 1970s. Former colonies of the British and French thus entered an 
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international system in which the only legitimate model of statehood was the Western liberal 
model that created children as legal subjects, advanced the notion of a universal childhood, 
established the state (and increasingly, the international community) as the rightful guardian of 
children’s interests, and affirmed the role of the rapidly developing international community in 
promoting and securing children’s welfare.   
Globalized childhood 
In the second half of the 20th century, the globalized model of childhood—based on the 
consensus on children’s universal vulnerability, limited culpability and need of care in several 
areas—became more complex and specific. The diffusion of this model of childhood occurred on 
many levels. First, an increasingly global community of child advocacy and a set of norms 
protecting children emerged through early-20th century efforts by organizations such as the 
League of Nations and the Save the Children International Fund, eventually finding sure footing 
in the United Nations, especially within UNICEF. The agency was the single most important 
actor in the promulgation of Western norms about children and childhood throughout the world, 
especially in developing countries after World War II. Established in 1946 primarily as an aid 
organization, UNICEF expanded its mission to include campaigns focusing on health, sanitation, 
education and child care, eventually adopting a comprehensive child approach that looked at 
multiple areas of child development. UNICEF and these other organizations were central to the 
internationalization of childhood, promoting Western norms of child welfare through their 
development efforts.  
 Second, world conferences, meetings, special sessions and summits, some sponsored by 
the United Nations, were also key to diffusing a global model of childhood to states. These 
prestigious and influential events “display world culture under construction” (Lechner and Boli, 
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2005: 84). These meetings and events became common in the 19th century, but since World War 
II, they have taken on a more symbolic, prominent and global role, offering an authoritative 
stance on a wide range of issues relevant to international institutions (Lechner and Boli, 2005: 
84). Through the mobilization, organization, assessment and follow-up they entail, U.N. 
meetings, in particular, have become a type of “secular ritual,” expressing a global consensus on 
global matters (Lechner and Boli, 2005: 89). The most important meeting on children in the last 
50 years was the 1990 World Summit on Children, corresponding with the 1990 Convention on 
the Rights of the Child (CRC). At this summit, the largest assembly of world leaders ever 
convened (at that time) participated in what was heralded by UNICEF as a “dramatic affirmation 
of the centrality of children to our common future” (UNICEF, 2002).  
Finally, the growth and increasing complexity of international law have gradually 
produced a still expanding and ever more detailed model of childhood, one that is in fact 
globalized. Three declarations and one convention about children were drafted during the 20th 
century: the 1924 Geneva Declaration, the 1948 Declaration on the Rights of the Child, the 1959 
Declaration on the Rights of the Child and the 1990 CRC. Each of these legal texts offers a view 
of the model of childhood as it then existed and reflects contemporary ideas about children and 
the role of the state and of parents (and, in the case of the 1990 CRC, of the international 
community) in ensuring children’s welfare. These documents provide a window onto the shifting 
boundaries and growing substance of a global model of childhood.  
Of the four declarations and conventions specifically addressing children, only the CRC 
prohibits the death penalty for child offenders. Yet other conventions and treaties also ban the 
penalty for those under 18: The first international treaty to ban the execution of some child 
offenders was the 1949 Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time 
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of War. Article 68 states that “protected persons” who commit their crimes when they are 
younger than 18 cannot be given the death penalty. Additionally, the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) also bans the penalty in Article 6. In examining one aspect of 
the globalized model of childhood—justice and punishment—it is evident that protections for 
children under the law greatly increased in the 13 years between the 1976 ICCPR and the 1990 
CRC, while the age parameters of the norm of abolition for child offenders remained the same. 
The model of childhood advanced by the CRC was also significantly more detailed, complex and 
wider in scope than previous attempts to enumerate rights and protections for children.  
Although children and childhood became a new focal point of international human rights 
efforts in the last half of the 20th century, the issue of the child death penalty remained obscure 
until Amnesty International and its American chapter (along with other national and international 
NGOs) took it up in the 1980s and 1990s. Amnesty International’s campaign against the child 
death penalty was international, but it focused its resources on the United States, although China 
and Pakistan (two other case studies for this project), among other states, were also targeted. 
Employing a moral authority derived from its legacy as a champion of human rights and 
harnessing the legitimacy of the emerging children’s rights regime, Amnesty and others were 
able to put the issue of the child death penalty on the international human rights agenda.  
The 1990 CRC began a period of intense international consolidation of authority over 
childhood, as international law and the institutions established to monitor it came to be viewed as 
the definitive authority on the treatment of children by the state. All states in the international 
system have ratified the CRC except for two, the United States and Somalia.xi The convention’s 
nearly universal ratification indicates global acknowledgment of a model of childhood that all 
states should adopt.   
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The late 20th and early 21st centuries were the setting for a dramatic contestation between 
state sovereignty and international law prohibiting the child death penalty, as laggard states, such 
as the United States, China and Pakistan, struggled between resistance to and compliance with 
international principles. While both China and Pakistan have accepted the norm’s legitimacy 
through the ratification of international treaties and the passage of national legislation, domestic 
factors, such as incomplete birth registration and lack of full control of territory, hinder full 
compliance. In the U.S. case, the increased citation of international and foreign law in Supreme 
Court decisions contributed to the United States’ vulnerability to international pressure, as did 
the escalating rebuke of the United States by U.N. agencies, diplomats, NGOs and other nations 
and the successful campaigns at the U.S. state level that helped to create a national consensus on 
the issue. The United States abolished the penalty in 2005 in the U.S. Supreme Court case Roper 
v. Simmons. In the cases of Pakistan and the United States, late-stage principled activism 
reinforced global pressure to end the child death penalty.  
Importantly, international law itself concerning children’s rights now often serves as the 
sole justification for bringing states into compliance with the global model of childhood and 
standards of child welfare. Just how quickly that model and the body of law that undergirds it 
have grown in such a short time is plain. In the early years after World War II, international 
efforts targeting children were justified as emergency relief—on the basis of children’s physical 
needs for proper nutrition, sanitation, vaccines, etc., needs supported by studies in the natural 
sciences. As international efforts expanded in the 1960s and 1970s, the child was increasingly 
linked (now by the social sciences) to the development of the nation and to the ushering of states 
into the international community as economic partners. With the growth of the international 
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children’s rights regime in the 1990s, there is no need for further justification to protect children. 
Children are rights holders, and international law alone serves to justify attention and assistance. 
 
Conclusion 
International law on children’s rights, in important ways, usurps state authority over the 
ideology of childhood, establishing complicated and exacting standards that all states should 
adopt. Although international law concerning children lacks an enforcement mechanism, it 
nonetheless serves as a means of confronting states about their child policies and forces them to 
address these norms as they participate in international institutions. The international 
community’s enshrinement of children as rights holders and consolidation of power over the 
boundaries and standards of childhood mirrors international consolidation of human rights in 
general after World War II, as the international community increasingly became the arbiter of 
acceptable treatment of citizens by states.  
Although I am certain that the idea of childhood did not originate in the West, as at least 
some type of recognition of the differences between very young children and adults appears to be 
common across cultures, it is evident that numerical, age-based legal norms about children 
diffused globally from the West. The British and French, in particular, advocated and enforced 
legal norms against the child death penalty in their colonies. These norms expressed ideas about 
the nature of children that formed the basis of a model of childhood. This model, characterized 
by the immaturity, vulnerability and reduced culpability of children (biologically, 
psychologically, intellectually), by the upper age limit of 18 years, and by a relationship between 
the state and the child in which the state assumed responsibility for the child’s welfare, became 
the international model found in the CRC and advanced by U.N. organs such as UNICEF. 
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After World War II, children fast became part of the civilizing rhetoric of the 
international community, and the momentum of the postwar zeitgeist helped to spread 
protections for children, even though international law was slow to develop in this area. An 
international children’s rights regime began modestly with the series of conventions and 
declarations about children and with the ICCPR in the 1960s and 1970s and was then bolstered 
and broadened in scope with the ratification of the CRC in the 1990s. The development of rights 
and protections for children in international law meant that states no longer had complete control 
over the way children were treated. Childhood was now an international idea. In a very real way, 
the state was divested of full authority over children since state policies and practices were now 
seen as a legitimate international concern.  
The shift in authority over children from the state to the international community marked 
the completion of a greater and more gradual pattern of divestment from the father, who was 
sovereign of the family, and the tribe, to the state and finally from the state to the international 
community. This power over childhood is ideological. By articulating standards of childhood, 
the international community assumes the power to define childhood, which includes identifying 
areas of protection, setting the scope of protections, identifying violations of those protections 
and establishing processes of adjudication when violations occur. This postwar pattern, whereby 
the international community took ideological control over the content, scope and measure of 
human rights norms and principles, created the modern rights regime, a body in progress of legal 
norms that includes the prohibition against the child death penalty.  
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Endnotes 
 
                                                 
i In recent years, a number of scholars have begun to examine the role of the child in international relations and have 
made important contributions to the field. Please see the ‘state of the field’ following this section. 
ii
  The 1990 Convention on the Rights of the Child defines a child as “every human being below the age of 18 
years.” Teenagers can be children (below the age of 18) or legal adults (18- and 19-year olds). The age limits of the 
child death penalty varied over time and between states, ranging from age 7 (in early common law systems) to age 
18. See endnote v below for the differences in minimum age in the American judicial system.  
iii
 See for example Achvarina and Reich, 2006; Brocklehurst, 2006; Carpenter, 2000; de Berry, 2001; Faulkner, 
2001; Hicks, 2001; McEvoy-Levy, 2006; and Thompson, 1999. 
iv
 See for example Canagarajah and Skyt Nielson, 2001; Chowdhry and Beeman, 2001; and Myers, 2001.  
v
 See for example Bartholet, 2011; Bohman, 2011; Earls, 2011; James, 2011; Rehfeld, 2011; and Van Bueren, 2011. 
vi
 As late as the 1988 U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Thompson v. Oklahoma, some U.S. states did not have a 
minimum age for the death penalty. As such, the minimum age for the penalty was taken from British law as seven 
or 14, depending on the demonstration of mens rea. No U.S. state codified seven as the minimum age, although 
some states set their age limits younger than 14 at the time of the Thompson ruling: Indiana set its minimum age for 
the penalty at 10; Mississippi’s minimum age was 13; and Montana’s was 12. Arizona, Delaware, Florida (if the 
defendant had prior convictions), Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota and Washington had no 
minimum age at the time of the Thompson ruling. Sources indicate there was no minimum age by statute for Idaho 
or Utah, either. No executions of children under the age 13 were recorded in the United States in the 20th century. 
(Amnesty International, 1991: 64; Bedau, 1997; Seligson, 1986: 5)  
vii
 Some predominantly Catholic countries argue that life begins at conception. The beginning of childhood is 
therefore still a contested part of the model. See Van Bueran (1998) for a more detailed discussion of this issue.  
viii
 In Figure 1, I include both abolition of the death penalty in general and abolition of the penalty for child 
offenders. 
ix
 In Britain, see the 1536 Apprenticing of Parish Poor Children (27 Hen. VIII, c. 25); the 1562 Apprenticeship under 
the Elizabethan Statute of Artificers (5 Eliz., c. 4); the 1572 Poor Law Act (14 Eliz., c. 5); the 1601 Further 
Provision for Apprenticing Pauper Children (43 Eliz., c. 2); and the 1661 Poor Relief Act (13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 12).  
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x
 Also referred to as liberal constructivism 
xi
 The youngest state in the system, South Sudan, has yet to succeed to the CRC at the time of this writing.  
